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Introduction
Since the start of the European Monetary Union (EMU) fiscal policy in the Euro area has been dominated by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). However, the SGP has been unsuccessful in fulfilling both of its goals, fiscal sustainability and supporting economic growth: In recent years, more and more countries have exceeded the 3 percent of GDP limit for the budget deficit. At the same time, macroeconomic performance has been unsatisfactory, with the Euro area economy only slowly recovering from the post-2000 stagnation. The prolonged stagnation as well as the ongoing fiscal problems have revived the macroeconomic debate on a reform of the SGP. A reform was finally introduced after a legal conflict between the European Commission and the European Council about the Council's right to simply ignore the Commission's recommendation to further pursue the excessive deficit procedures against France and Germany. However, the reform did not fundamentally change the SGP.
Therefore, the economic and political debates on SGP reforms continue. In the current paper we would like to contribute to this debate. After a rather detailed account of fiscal policy developments and their impact on the Euro area economy, we present a modified expenditure path concept as an alternative to the current SGP.
The paper is an extension of our earlier work, in which we tried to explain the long-run growth and employment differentials between the Euro area and the USA by a macroeconomic policy view, stressing the more restrictive stance of monetary, fiscal and wage policies under the 'Maastricht Regime'. 1 We proceed as follows: Section 2 compares the macroeconomic performance in the Euro area and its individual member countries with the performance of the US economy. Section 3 provides a more detailed description of fiscal policies and consolidation efforts in the Euro area since 1991. In Section 4 we analyse the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy and in Section 5 we will put this in a broader perspective discussing also monetary and wage policies. In Section 6 we comment on the recent modifications of the SGP and present our reform proposal based on expenditure paths.
Section 7 points to a potential drawback by asking whether fiscal policy can really improve 1 See Hein/Truger (2005a , 2005b and Hein/Niechoj (2006) on the Maastricht regime, Hein/Truger (2005c , 2005d on the special situation of the German economy and Hein/Truger (2006a) , Hein/Schulten/Truger (2006) on the risks of deflation in Germany and Europe associated with this constellation. Also Fritsche et al. (2005) , Palley (1998) and Solow (2000) have argued that a favourable coordination between monetary and fiscal policies rather than deregulated labour markets can be held responsible for the superior development of the US-economy during the 1990s compared to Germany or the EU.
growth and employment under the current regime of monetary and wage policies in Europe.
Section 8 concludes.
Unsatisfactory macroeconomic performance in the Euro area
Since the growth slowdown in 2000/1 the Euro area has had a difficult time to recover and macroeconomic performance has been worse than in the USA. There the economy returned rather quickly to its impressive growth path of the late 1990s. On average over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] , annual real GDP-growth in the Euro area has remained more than 1 percentage point below US-growth (Table 1) . The growth differential, already to be found since the start of the convergence process towards the EMU in the mid-1990s (Hein/Niechoj 2006) , seems to have become persistent. The unemployment rate in the Euro area is still considerably above the US level. Between 2001 and 2005 inflation in the Euro area has on average slightly exceeded the European Central Bank's (ECB) inflation target of 'below, but close to, 2 percent in the medium term' (ECB 2003: 79) . But the deviation from the US inflation rate is rather small. Taken together, in recent years the US-economy has once more managed to combine reasonable growth, low unemployment and low inflation in a far better manner than the Euro area.
Slow growth and high unemployment are by no means equally distributed across the Euro area (Table 1) . Whereas during the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] in particular the large economies Germany and Italy, together with the Netherlands and Portugal, have been suffering from real GDP growth rates well below the Euro area average, Spain, Finland, Greece and Ireland have experienced growth considerably above this average. The unemployment rates display a wide dispersion across Euro area countries, too. Finally, also inflation rates show major differences between Euro area countries, with rates well below the ECB's target in Germany and Finland, and well above the target in Spain, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal. Commission 2002) . As conditions of entry to the monetary union, the Maastricht Treaty set a maximum deficit ratio (proportion of current budget deficit in relation to GDP) of 3 percent and a maximum debt ratio (proportion of public debt in relation to GDP) of 60 percent. In 1997, the SGP made this regulation even tougher by prescribing for the medium term, i.e. a time span which stretches across economic cycles, balanced budgets or budget surpluses in order to reduce the level of debt. 2 Achieving these conditions was intended, on the one hand, to enable the automatic stabilisers to work during economic downturns without violating the 3 percent deficit criterion. On the other hand, it should ensure the long run sustainability of public finances. Especially, it was intended to create leeway for possible future funding objectives which may arise from demographic developments such as social security provision for the elderly.
The SGP requires member states to present annual stability programmes to the European Commission, which describe how they intend to achieve balanced budgets, and which can be employed as an advance notice when a country is approaching the 3 percent limit for its current budget deficit. If this mark is exceeded, the 'excessive deficit procedure' (EDP) is applied (EC Treaty, Art. 104). If the country is not in a deep recession, defined as an annual real GDP shrinkage of more than 2 percent, and if the country in question refuses to introduce consolidation measures, penalties of up to 0.5 percent of GDP per year may ultimately be incurred. In spring 2005 the SGP has been modified so as to mitigate the strictness of the excessive deficit procedure somewhat. In Section 6 we turn to a more detailed description and evaluation of these modifications which have not questioned the substance of the original SGP.
With respect to deficit reduction, fiscal policy has been rather successful ( Figure 1 , Table 2 ).
For the Euro area as a whole the buget balance was reduced from an average -5.1 percent of GDP in the first half of the 1990s to -2. average interest burden of public debt is at least partly due to the remarkable reduction in the average long term nominal interest rates which was caused by the rapid interest rate convergence towards the lower German level. In that respect fiscal policy obviously gained from the common currency. Similar tendencies with respect to public deficit reduction can be found for most of the single member countries, albeit to quite different extents (Table 2) .
Belgium, Finland, Greece, Italy and Spain stand out with particularly large deficit reductions above 5 percentage points. Together with Portugal -and with the exception of Finland -these are also the countries that gained the most from falling interest rates.
Fiscal policy has been rather unsuccessful in stabilising the gross debt-GDP-ratio (Table 3) .
For the Euro area as a whole this ratio went up from an average 65. Many countries did not succeed in complying with the deficit rules of the SGP (see Table 4 ).
Over the last four years, for the Euro area as a whole the deficit ratio has been close to the 3 percent limit within a narrow band between 2.4 and 3.0 percent of GDP. Since the start of the EMU, six out of twelve member countries have exceeded the 3 percent limit of the SGP, with the exception of the Netherlands all of them three times or more. 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 
The macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy
In order to take account of the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy it is not sufficient to look at the development of actual deficits, as in the previous section. Actual deficits may simply reflect the underlying economic situation and not active fiscal policy. Therefore, we assess the extent to which fiscal policy exerts a stabilising or destabilising influence on the business cycle by comparing changes in the output gap and the cyclically adjusted budget balance-potential GDP ratio (CBR), using the relevant values from the OECD Economic Such cyclically adjusted measures can be criticised for a number of theoretical and empirical reasons and should therefore be interpreted with great care. Theoretically, they are very close to the idea embedded in the standard NAIRU models: There is a long-run equilibrium, determined by structural characteristics of the labour market, which is independent of the short-run fluctuations generated by demand shocks or macroeconomic policy. We do not share this view (Hein 2004 (Hein , 2006a (Hein , 2006b period, therefore, it must be concluded that fiscal policy in the USA has played its macroeconomic stabilisation role properly, whereas in the Euro area fiscal policy has acted in an often pro-cylical and therefore destabilising way For the individual Euro area countries the picture is rather diverse (Table 5) 
Therefore, it is hard to escape the conclusion, that the SGP did lead to destabilising, procyclical fiscal policy reactions to the post-2000 crisis in several countries. With the exception of Greece and to some extent also France, all the countries with excessive deficit problems stopped their initially expansive fiscal policy and were driven into pro-cyclical, restrictive measures as soon as their deficit had reached the 3 percent of GDP limit. Without doubt, the resulting negative fiscal stance has contributed to the ongoing stagnation tendencies after 2000 within these countries and in the Euro area as a whole. Of course, fiscal policy is only one factor in the explanation of macroeconomic performance. However, with respect to GDP growth it is striking that all of the four countries with below Euro area average growth rates (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal) suffered from inadequately restrictive fiscal policies. And from the four countries with above average growth rates, after all three countries (Ireland, Finland and Greece) had expansive fiscal policies.
It is sometimes argued that the countries with excessive deficits might have avoided their problems and the ensuing pro-cyclical fiscal policy if they had pursued a tighter fiscal policy during 'good times'. At the first sight this argument has some appeal as most of the countries in question had at least one short episode of pro-cyclical expansion at the end of the 1990s or in 2000. However, stronger fiscal restriction could have meant some damage. As a rough estimate suggests, in order to avoid excessive deficits and pro-cyclically restrictive policies in the period from 2001 to 2005, the countries concerned would have had to decrease their budget deficits by an additional 2 to 4 percent of GDP within only 2 or 3 years. Moreover, the restriction would have hit the economies in a situation in which they were just recovering from the early and mid-1990s stagnation with a prolonged period of tight and often procyclical fiscal policies. Without doubt, the 'good times' would have been turned into 'bad times' by such a policy. As the ultimate retreat proponents of tighter fiscal policy might question that restrictive fiscal policy causes any demand side problems, at all, due to 'nonKeynesian effects' of fiscal consolidation (see e.g. Alesina Perotti 1996). However, it has convincingly been argued that such a position cannot be defended in any sensible way (see e.g. Arestis/Sawyer 2003).
The macroeconomic impact of monetary policy and wage developments
Macroeconomic performance cannot be explained solely by fiscal policy but has also to take into account monetary and wage policies. Monetary policy can be assessed by the development of the short-term real interest rate. It is now widely accepted that modern central banks use the short-term nominal interest rate as an economic policy instrument. If central banks target inflation they have to set nominal interest rates with an eye to the ensuing real rate, as proposed in the famous Taylor-rule, for example (Taylor 1993) . In order to take into account the underlying economic situation, we consult the differences between both the shortand long-term real interest rate and real GDP-growth. We expect a negative influence of real interest rates on economic growth working through different transmission channels (money, credit, asset prices, exchange rates) (Bernanke/Gertler 1995 , Cecchetti 1995 . ECB policy has been particularly harmful for the largest Euro area member country, Germany (Table 6 ). As the German inflation rate has been lower than the EMU average and the nominal interest rates have almost completely converged since 1999, Germany's real interest rates have even been higher than the Euro area average since then. This has contributed to an unfavourable short-term real interest rate-real GDP growth-difference. Germany was the only member country in which that difference was positive on average over the period 2001-2005. On the other hand, the high inflation countries Spain, Greece and Ireland have had negative short-term real interest rates and a very growth favourable constellation with negative differences between both the short-and long-term real interest rate and real GDP growth. (Bhaduri/Marglin 1990) . With the propensity to save out of wages falling short of the savings propensity out of profits, a falling labour income share means a cut-back in consumption demand and capacity utilisation with directly contractive effects on investment and GDP growth. A fall in labour income shares that is associated with nominal wage restraint would, on the other hand, improve international competitiveness and, therefore, stimulate export demand, investment and growth. With a slowdown in inflation, the central bank may also cut interest rates and stimulate investment and growth. Finally, a falling labour income share is associated with rising unit profits which may also improve investment and growth. 5 The ECB has tended to tighten whenever inflation increased above the target without relaxing when inflation expectations came down. For a general critique of the ECB's 'anti-growth bias' see Bibow (2002 Bibow ( , 2005a Bibow ( , 2005b Hein (2002) and Hein/Truger (2006b Hein (2006a Hein ( , 2006b ) for the integration of real debt effects into Kaleckian models of distribution and growth with conflict inflation.
Since the stimulating effects of wage moderation and declining labour income shares for investment and growth are rather indirect and uncertain, in particular in large and rather closed economies as the Euro area and the USA, the direct and contractive effects will presumably dominate here. And since nominal wage increases, which will shift distribution in favour of labour income, will also trigger inflation and concomitant restrictive central bank interventions, nominal wage growth according to the sum of long-run productivity growth and the central bank's inflation target and hence roughly stable labour income shares should be generally favourable for growth and employment in large and rather closed currency areas.
On average over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] , nominal wage growth in the Euro area has been lagging behind the USA (Table 6 ). But taking into account productivity growth, nominal wage increases in both currency areas have been stability oriented: nominal unit labour costs have grown by 1.7 percent and have hence not caused any inflationary pressures. Moderate wage increases were accompanied by a decline in the labour income share, both in the Euro area and in the USA. Whereas in the USA this decline compensated for the increase in the previous years generating a stationary trend since the early 1990s, in the Euro area the recent decline has continued the decreasing trend since the early 1990s. Although labour income shares in the two economies had similar levels in the early 1990s, the Euro area value is by now 4 percentage points below the US-value contributing to domestic demand problems in Europe.
Below the surface of Euro area aggregate values there is a wide dispersion of wages and nominal unit labour cost growth rates ( Germany, and to a lesser extent also Italy, the conditions generated by monetary and wage policies in themselves seem to have been adverse to growth. In the four countries just mentioned, therefore fiscal policy seems to have played the role of an additional factor amplifying the tendencies generated by the other policy areas. In Spain, the slightly restrictive effect of fiscal policy was too weak to compensate for the favourable growth conditions generated by monetary and wage policies. However, it seems that in the Netherlands and Portugal, where monetary and wage policies reactions were rather close to the Euro area average, fiscal policy turned the balance towards the below average growth performance. The same seems to hold for Finland's above average growth.
Improving fiscal policy within the EMU: Towards an expenditure path concept

The 2005 reform
In the light of these results, a reform of the SGP was inevitable. The recent reform in spring 2005 means some important changes (European Council 2005) . Alongside substantial modifications with respect to the medium term objectives, which permit some deviation from the 'close to balance or in surplus rule' depending on national circumstances, the application of the EDP has been reformed and softened to some extent: The Council has specified the 'relevant factors' to determine whether a country exceeding the 3 percent limit 'really' has an excessive deficit. The previous exception of a severe economic downturn has been softened and it is now included an accumulated loss of output due to protracted very slow growth. The following types of spending may justify a temporary and small transgression of the deficit limit: spending on the Lisbon agenda, especially R&D and innovation policies, public investment, financial contributions to international solidarity and European unification as well as pension reforms. Debt sustainability is to be given greater relevance, too. Also the deadlines before identifying excessive deficits, taking action following a policy recommendation, and for the deficit to actually be corrected have all been extended.
The reform has addressed one of the most obvious failings of the original SGP: Countries with difficulties in meeting the 3 percent ceiling or the close to balance medium-term target now have a range of possible factors that they can call upon to justify their inability to meet the targets. Some of the factors -debt sustainability or spending on the Lisbon agenda certainly make more sense from a macroeconomic point of view than others (pension reform).
Nevertheless, the reform has increased fiscal leeway for some countries to a certain extent. 
Expenditure paths for non-cyclical government spending
We take as given that fiscal policy remains essentially a matter of national responsibility. The goal for national fiscal policy is having automatic stabilisers work -always under the constraint that for the individual countries a given medium term debt-GDP-ratio is not exceeded. Without such a limit, there may arise the ultimate danger of an ever accelerating government debt limiting the room of manoeuvre for public investment and other desirable government expenditure. Increasing public interest payments may also have serious regressive distributional effects with a negative impact on aggregate demand.
To this end, the individual countries should establish expenditure paths for non-cyclical spending, which would be financed in the long term by tax revenue. 11 Cyclical spending should then be allowed to float freely around this target without being constrained by budget deficit limits. In this concept, governments can and should refrain from discretionary tax 9 For an up to date overview of the EDPs see the relevant internet pages of the European Commission under http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/about/activities/sgp/procedures_en.htm. 10 Buti et al. (2003) give an overview of a series of reform approaches which for reasons of space cannot be discussed here. For an overview of the more recent debate on the SGP see Coeuré/Pisani-Ferry (2005) and Calmfors (2005) . 11 For the original proposal for the Euro area see Hein/Truger (2005d ) . On similar proposals for Germany see Bartsch et al. (2002) , Eicker-Wolf/Truger (2003) and Horn/Truger (2005) . These proposals are based on the work of Horn/Scheremet (1999) who refer to the successful process of budget consolidation in the US during the 1990s.
cuts/increases other than for purposes of changing the level of government spending. In a downturn, increases in expenditure and falls in revenue cause budget deficits which are financed by borrowing, thus increasing the level of debt. In an upturn, on the other hand, budget surpluses arise, which are used for consolidation purposes. If non-cyclical spending grows at a higher rate than long-term nominal GDP, the result is rising super-cyclical budget deficits. If it grows at a slower rate, structural deficits are reduced. Alignment of the expenditure path with a growth rate below the long-term nominal GDP path can therefore contribute to a revenue-side budget consolidation, if a structural deficit requiring consolidation existed at the outset. Therefore, countries exceeding their public debt target value should choose an expenditure growth rate slightly below nominal GDP trend growth, whereas others could let expenditure grow at the same rate as nominal trend GDP. 12 Of course, such values for the expenditure paths should be a matter for co-ordination between member countries. In addition, with a modernised stability pact there should be checks to ensure that individual countries comply with the prescribed expenditure paths for non-cyclical public spending. Moreover, the appropriateness of these expenditure paths themselves should also be subject to regular review, since the reference variable, i.e. the nominal potential GDP path, is liable to change as a result of public and private investment activity.
In our view, the expenditure path concept has several advantages. 13 First, with respect to consolidation, the ultimate target value is the debt-GDP-ratio, which is much more directly relevant for fiscal sustainability than budget deficits. Second, the chosen variable, noncyclical government spending, is in fact under the government's control, whereas the budget deficit is an endogenous variable of the whole macroeconomic process. Third, the expenditure path allows for automatic stabilisers to take effect. The adoption of pro-cyclical fiscal policies 12 Taking nominal GDP trend growth as a reference for non-cyclical spending may be problematic if there are large variations in the inflation rate. The trend may then be subject to frequent changes that do not reflect changes in the underlying real growth trend. Additionally, there might be an incentive for governments to inflate, in order to get more fiscal leeway. We are grateful to Joerg Bibow and Andrea Terzi for pointing out this latter possibility to us. Therefore, one might also use the real GDP trend plus the ECB's target rate as a reference for the expenditure path. In order to simplify the exposition we refrain from doing so in the text. Nevertheless, we have included the real GDP trend plus the inflation target in Table 8 . 13 It has been argued that expenditure paths imply a very specific concept of the desirable public spending ratio and that they therefore restrict national governments' room for manoeuvre (Buti et al. 2003a: 104) . However, it should be pointed out that in the context of the concept presented here, first, the paths established are countryspecific. Second, the path approach does actually allow for changes in the public spending-GDP-ratio. In this case, however, an increase in this ratio would have to be financed by additional taxation. A reduction in the public spending-GDP-ratio would be possible by lowering the expenditure path and taxation. Although this could have the effect of increasing the average restrictiveness of fiscal policy, the adjustment would nevertheless be smoothed out and the automatic stabilisers would be able to continue operating in a somewhat weakened fashion around the lower path.
is prevented. Fourth, there is real coordination of fiscal policies within the Euro area, preventing free rider behaviour. Pressure from the European level might also help to enforce counter-cyclical fiscal policy on the level of the individual countries. Fifth, under the current macroeconomic regime dominated by monetary policy, macro-economically sensible and hence 'credible' rules for fiscal policy might also induce the ECB to cooperate.
An adjusted expenditure path concept with a bit more discretion
How would the Euro area and its member countries have fared in the period 2001 to 2005 under the described expenditure path regime? As the concept relies completely on automatic stabilisers, one can use the results of the analysis of cyclical deficits from Table 5 However, this rather mixed evaluation changes considerably, if one takes a look not only at the development of structural deficits but also at the average growth rates of public expenditures and revenues (Table 8) . If we take the growth rate of final government consumption as a proxy for non-cyclical expenditure, according to the expenditure path, final government consumption should grow in line with the nominal GDP trend (moving average of the growth rates of the past six years). The same applies for government investment and also subsidies. Government social benefits and interest payments may vary with cyclical fluctuations; the former can be expected to grow at a higher rate than nominal GDP trend during economic slowdowns and rising unemployment. In the absence of discretionary tax increases/tax cuts, public revenue should grow in line with actual nominal GDP.
For the Euro area as a whole and for most of the countries, especially for Germany, public revenues grew at a rate significantly lower than actual nominal GDP. This is a strong indication, that there have been substantial discretionary tax cuts in many countries (for Germany: Truger/Jacoby 2004 , Truger 2004 . At the same time, for some of these countries, especially again for Germany, non-cyclical government expenditure, and in fact also total expenditure grew at a significantly lower rate than nominal trend GDP. Also quite strikingly, for some countries the growth rate of social benefits has been lower than could be expected from the extent of the economic slump. Therefore, in some countries a more expansive fiscal Two objections may be raised. First, automatic stabilisers in the USA are usually estimated to be considerably lower than in most European welfare states, so that relying on automatic stabilisers might nevertheless be sufficient in Europe. Second, it is well known that the US government reacted to a large part with aggressive tax cuts to the post-2000 slowdown, which may be rather ineffective due to low multipliers. However, both objections cannot change the basic conclusion. First, with respect to automatic stabilisers, the overall fiscal policy reaction in the USA was much more aggressive than anything that could have been achieved by automatic stabilisers in any Euro area country: The actual deficit in the USA was increased by Additionally, one must take into account that many of the labour market reform strategies advocated by the European commission would actually lead to a considerable weakening of automatic stabilisers in Europe (Mabbett/Schelkle 2005) . Second, with respect to tax cuts, although the Bush tax cuts played a very substantial role in the fiscal expansion in the USA the expenditure side was also much more expansive than its Euro area counterpart, with a growth rate of government final consumption substantially above nominal GDP trend growth (Table 8) . Moreover, fiscal policy has been much more expansive in the USA even though the Fed's monetary policy was much more aggressive than the ECB's reluctant and restrictive monetary policy (Section 5). Moreover, the ECB's interest rate policy can only be oriented towards the economic situation in the Euro area as a whole. It cannot take into account the specific national economic circumstances of those countries which were hit especially by the post-2000-slowdown. Therefore, in the case of asymmetric shocks in a monetary union the case for discretionary national fiscal policy is on the agenda.
Therefore, the expenditure path concept has to be modified in order to allow for stronger fiscal expansion during economic slowdowns and recessions. As one measure, for example, public investment above the level implied by the expenditure path could be allowed for.
Additionally, discretionary increases in social benefits, other expenditure categories or perhaps also certain tax cuts might be applicable. All such transgressions of the path should, of course, be coordinated on a European level. In order to reconcile such periods of more aggressively expansionary discretionary fiscal policies with the goal of fiscal sustainability, the expenditure path for non-cyclical spending would have to be slightly below nominal trend GDP growth during 'good times' in order to allow for sufficient consolidation. 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 nominal GDP growth nominal GDP trend gov final expenditure total disbursements total revenue social benefits Actually, this seems to have been exactly the strategy US fiscal policy has chosen ( Figure 5 ).
In the USA, non-cyclical government expenditure grew at a rate of about 3 percent from 1992 until 1998, whereas the nominal GDP trend grew between 5 and 6 percent. During the persistent upswing with decreasing unemployment, the growth rate of social benefits declined.
At the same time, tax revenues grew more than proportionately, as is to be expected in the absence of major tax cuts. The result was fiscal consolidation: By 1998 the government budget was in balance. After consolidation had been achieved, non-cyclical expenditure grew in line with nominal GDP trend until the slowdown in 2000/2001. Since then non-cyclical expenditure growth has been significantly accelerated. In addition, social benefits have been raised in a discretionary way and huge tax cuts have been implemented, thus exerting an enormous fiscal stimulus to the economy. Since 2004, well after the recovery had been achieved, tax revenues have been accelerating strongly again. At the same time the expansion of government expenditure has been decreased to a certain amount. It remains to be seen, whether fiscal policy in the USA will repeat its successful consolidation strategy of the 1990s.
In striking contrast to the US experience, fiscal policy in the Euro area was much less systematic. (Figure 6 ) There is no systematic pattern in the development of government final consumption. Years with strong counter-cyclical restriction (1997) are followed by procyclical expansion (1999 and 2000) , which in turn is followed by pro-cyclical restriction since
2004. Revenue growth rates are subject to substantial variation which hints at intermittent hectic attempts of consolidation and stimulation. Therefore, Euro area fiscal policy could learn a lot from its US counterpart. 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 nominal GDP growth nominal GDP trend gov final expenditure total disbursements total revenue social benefits
Can fiscal policy do the job under the current regime of monetary and wage policy?
Switching from the current SGP to a suitable concept based on expenditure paths would substantially improve fiscal policy's macroeconomic stabilisation role while at the same time not endangering the medium-term objective of fiscal sustainability. This result has been implicitly derived under the ceteris paribus assumption with respect to the other policy areas, monetary and wage policies. Unfortunately, however, it is highly probable that the advocated change in the fiscal policy regime would lead to reactions in the other areas. Under the current 'Maastricht regime' dominating the Euro area, these reactions might worsen macroeconomic performance. In the end, isolated changes in fiscal policy institutions might not be sufficient.
The switch to an adjusted expenditure path concept during the period from 2001 to 2005
would have meant a more expansive fiscal policy both for the Euro area as a whole and for most of the individual countries. It is questionable, whether the ECB would have tolerated such a policy. As it is a strong defender of the SGP in the strictest possible form, it might even be that fiscal policy has already entered the ECB's reaction function, so that it would have directly compensated a more expansive fiscal policy with a more restrictive monetary policy. Even in the absence of fiscal policy as an explicit argument in the ECB's reaction function under the current un-coordinated state of wage policy within the Euro area countries, a stronger fiscal expansion would have certainly led to an increase in wage growth. Given the ECB's too ambitiously low inflation target, the ensuing inflationary tendencies or just the improvement in the output gap, would certainly have induced the ECB to raise interest rates, thereby worsening macroeconomic conditions all over the Euro area. 14 As a side effect, government debt and interest payments would have further risen, limiting fiscal leeway in the future. Therefore, a thorough change in the framework of fiscal policies in the Euro area might require a similarly thorough change in the framework of monetary and wage policies to be effective in enhancing economic performance.
Conclusion
Since the start of the European Monetary Union fiscal policy in the Euro area has been dominated by the SGP. Quite obviously the SGP has been unsuccessful in fulfilling its goals, fiscal sustainability and supporting economic growth. More and more countries have exceeded the 3 percent of GDP limit for the budget deficit and the public debt-GDP ratios have been growing, while at the same time macroeconomic performance has been unsatisfactory. It has been shown that, whereas US fiscal policy has acted in a strongly counter-cyclical way, stabilising the economy, in the Euro area fiscal policy has been much more restrictive and has had pro-cyclical and therefore destabilising effects for many countries. It has also been shown, that one cannot put all the blame on fiscal policy: The ECB's restrictive monetary policy and divergent wage developments across the Euro area are at least as important as fiscal policy in the explanation of the Euro area's weak economic performance. As a possible solution for the future we have suggested to replace the SGP by expenditure paths for non-cyclical spending as coordination tool, and we have discussed an important modification of the concept. Expenditure paths could co-ordinate fiscal policies within the Euro area in a counter-cyclical way and at the same time ensure fiscal sustainability. As the comparison with US fiscal policy suggested, the expenditure path should be set at a rate below nominal trend GDP with variations above trend allowed during economic downturns. Replacing the SGP with such an expenditure path concept would substantially contribute to a better macroeconomic performance within the Euro area.
Unfortunately, as long as monetary and wage policies remain un-coordinated and destabilising any isolated improvements in fiscal policy might not be very effective in enhancing economic performance. Therefore, the key to improving the Euro area economy is to establish a regime of coordinated macroeconomic policy including fiscal as well as monetary and wage policies.
